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The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy. By Richardson 
Dilworth, Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Reviewed by Nicole Stelle Garnett 
In my local government law course, I frequently begin by 
observing that local governments are both important and un-
derappreciated for the same reasons: they pick up trash, fix 
potholes, and treat sewage. Richardson Dilworths political his-
tory of metropolitan New York City and northern New Jersey1 
supports my observationalthough I continue to doubt that it 
is the most effective sales pitch to law students. By highlight-
ing the connection between public infrastructure and suburban 
political autonomy, Dilworths book also provides an important 
opportunity to consider how infrastructure policies shape met-
ropolitan America. 
Dilworth uses several case studies of late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century suburbs to link suburban political 
autonomy to public investments in water, roads, and sewers. 
He argues that big cities (here New York City, Jersey City, and 
Newark) developed infrastructure relatively early and then 
sought to use the promise of extended public works projects to 
entice their suburban neighbors to join them. Suburbanites 
wanted the services that big cities could offer, but worried that 
annexation meant political corruption and higher taxes. Subur-
ban governments which developed infrastructure independ-
ently remained autonomous; some which lagged behind sacri-
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 1. RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTON-
OMY (2005). 
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ficed their political independence to gain needed services.2 Over 
time, as urban governments perfected infrastructure develop-
ment techniques (and employed more and more engineers who 
could sell their services to developing suburbs), it became eas-
ier for suburbs to achieve political autonomy. Municipal con-
solidations and annexations became rare, leaving us with the 
hodgepodge of municipal governments that characterizes all 
American metropolitan areas.3 
Dilworths careful study does highlight the connection be-
tween infrastructure development and suburban political 
autonomy, but his thesisthat suburban infrastructural in-
vestments somehow caused metropolitan fragmentation4is 
unconvincing and unproven. One is struck when reading this 
book that the real origin of suburban autonomy is the suburban 
desire to remain autonomous. Suburbanites thenlike subur-
banites nowpreferred to maintain their independence from 
urban governments whenever possible. Certainly, some cities 
expanded geographically by promising needed services to their 
suburban neighbors. A well-known example is the annexation 
of the San Fernando Valley to Los Angeles in 1913,5 an uneasy 
marriage of convenience achieved with the promise of water 
that almost unraveled several years ago when a majority of 
Valley residents voted to secede and form their own municipal 
government.6 Other suburban communities turned away urban 
suitors because early investment in public works projects made 
annexation unnecessary. But, most interestingly, still others 
chose to spurn annexation and needed services because of wor-
ries that rapid development threatened their suburban iden-
tity. 
This book is an impressive work of history. Dilworth prom-
ises more, however, and a serious shortcoming of the book is his 
failure to apply the history to current debates about metropoli-
tan governance. While Dilworth does refer to these debates, his 
 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 2527. 
 3. See id. at 3235 (discussing the relationship between infrastructure 
development and metropolitan fragmentation). 
 4. Id. at 11. 
 5. See id. at 25 (describing Los Angeless decision to supply water to out-
lying communities only if they were annexed to the city). 
 6. See Sue Fox & Patrick McGreevy, Secessionists Weigh Options, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at B1 (noting that a slim majority of Valley residents ap-
proved of seceding from Los Angeles, but that state law required city-wide ap-
proval). 
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efforts at drawing connections between the historical case stud-
ies and modern local government policy are fleeting and unsat-
isfactory. As a result, many readers might question Dilworths 
broad assertion that microhistories connecting infrastructure 
development and suburban autonomy at the turn of the twenti-
eth century have continued relevance today. This is unfortu-
nate. Modern policymakers could, in fact, benefit from under-
standing whyfor exampleBrooklyn consolidated with New 
York City and Yonkers did not. This Essay represents my own 
brief, and far from complete, effort to follow through on Dil-
worths promise to connect the history presented in this book to 
modern local government and land use policy. 
As a prelude to that discussion, the Essay draws three les-
sons from Dilworths study. First, this book serves as a helpful 
reminder that suburban resistance to joining forces with cen-
tral cities has deep economic and psychological roots. This is 
not a hopeful history for proponents of regional governance. 
During the period Dilworth studies, some suburban communi-
ties may have reluctantly surrendered their autonomy to gain 
access to public works, but the tables have turned. Today, ur-
ban governments, with their aging infrastructure, might ap-
pear to have little to offer their more technologically advanced 
suburban neighbors. Second, the book highlights (albeit unin-
tentionally) the degree of autonomy exercised by local govern-
ments today. In so doing, this book tends to support the argu-
ment that the ills of metropolitan fragmentation stem not from 
weak urban governments, but rather from the strong suburban 
ones that began to emerge during the time that Dilworth stud-
ies.7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, Dilworth highlights 
that early suburban governments sought to preserve their 
uniquely suburban identities by, among other things, managing 
infrastructure development so as to attract the right kind of 
residents. By the turn of the twentieth century, it appears that 
Charles Tiebouts market for consumer-voters was develop-
ing.8 
The remainder of the Essay uses these historical lessons to 
reflect upon the continuing connection between suburban 
growth and public infrastructure policy. Over the course of the 
 
 7. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part IThe Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Lo-
calism]. 
 8. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 41720 (1956). 
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past century, rapid suburbanization has left most major Ameri-
can cities landlocked. They are surrounded by dozens (if not 
hundreds) of municipalities, many of which incorporated pre-
cisely to immunize themselves from annexation.9 It is an article 
of faith among antisprawl activists and academics that gov-
ernment subsidization of the kinds of public works that Dil-
worth studiesroads, water, and sewersencouraged subur-
banization.10 Dilworth seeks to add an interesting twist to this 
commonly accepted tale. While many scholars have explored 
the link between public works subsidies and suburban 
sprawl,11 he connects these subsidies to the beginnings of met-
ropolitan fragmentation, which itself fosters sprawl.12 
Many economists applaud metropolitan fragmentation, ar-
guing that it promotes competition between local governments. 
Because impediments to mobility are reduced within metropoli-
tan areas, a citizen may leave a locality with regulatory, tax, 
and public-goods priorities that are incompatible with her pref-
erences and locate in one that offers more attractive policies. 
Thus, fragmentation may increase governmental responsive-
ness and efficiency by subjecting local authorities to some ap-
 
 9. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 7377 (describing 
this process of defensive incorporation); see also NANCY BURNS, THE FORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTI-
TUTIONS 3738 (1994) (discussing incorporation as a response to threat of an-
nexation and higher taxes); GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT: THE 
POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION 79 (1981) (asserting that avoidance of 
annexation led to incorporation of multiple suburban localities near Los Ange-
les). On fragmentation, see Richard Briffault, The Local Government Bound-
ary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 111820 (1996) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem]. 
 10. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CON-
TROLS 795 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing causes of sprawl, including subsidies for 
roads and sewers). But cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHE-
SIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 67 (2001) (Many commentators nonethe-
less claim that local governments continue to subsidize sprawl . . . . [T]his 
myth . . . continues to be an article of faith among the antisprawl set.). 
 11. See, e.g., KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBUR-
BANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 13032 (1985) (discussing the massive 
public investments in roads, storm sewers, street lighting, curbs and gutters, 
playgrounds, and schools . . . necessary for growth). 
 12. DILWORTH, supra note 1; see, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-
Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2015 
(2000) (arguing that fragmentation inculcates a narrow conception of self-
interest); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 236 (2001) (recounting the malign account of suburban-
ites behavior). 
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proximation of market forces.13 Metropolitan fragmentation is 
not, of course, costless. Fragmented local power virtually guar-
antees that local governments decisions will affect neighboring 
municipalities in both positive and negative ways.14 Increasing 
numbers of local government and land use scholars have called 
for greater consolidation of local power in order to address the 
negatives, especially suburban sprawl and the stark economic 
and demographic differences within metropolitan areas.15 
These scholars propose a variety of institutional reforms to 
curb interlocal externalities and ensure a more equitable dis-
tribution of public resources. This debate has produced a rich 
literature that engages deep normative questions about the 
meaning of community, the purposes of local government, and 
the value of decentralized decisionmaking. 
This Essay uses Dilworths case studies of early metropoli-
tan fragmentation as a springboard for discussing the contin-
ued connection between public infrastructure investment, sub-
urban growth, and intrametropolitan equity. In particular, the 
Essay examines the tendency among opponents of metropolitan 
fragmentation to embrace limits on infrastructure subsidies as 
one solution to the sprawl problem. These new infrastructure 
 
 13. See, e.g., John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market 
Metaphor and Americas Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 (1997) 
(asserting that [d]iverse policy regimes can cater to heterogeneous prefer-
ences); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Fed-
eralism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 8386 (Dennis C. Mueller 
ed., 1997) (arguing that interlocal competition will increase efficiency in pro-
duction of public goods); Richard E. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition, 
Monopoly, and the Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J. L. 
& ECON. 661, 684 (1975) ([A]n increase in the number of competing and over-
lapping governments will lead the public economy more closely to perform as a 
competitive industry.); see also MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA 6369 (1989) (purporting to find that 
tax rates are lower in more fragmented metropolitan areas). 
 14. As Clayton Gillette has observed, it is a truism that [t]he actions of 
local governments affect their neighbors, sometimes in negative ways. Gil-
lette, supra note 12, at 190. 
 15. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMER-
ICA (1994); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 14365 (1999) [hereinafter FRUG, 
CITY MAKING]; MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 74104 (1997); NEAL R. 
PEIRCE, CITISTATES 291325 (1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 
(1993); Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at 1144
64; Cashin, supra note 12, at 202747; Richard Thompson Ford, The Bounda-
ries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 
190613 (1994); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
253, 31628 (1993) [hereinafter Frug, Decentering]. 
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policies16 have intuitive appeal: if infrastructure subsidies fos-
ter sprawl and enable metropolitan fragmentation, then limit-
ing subsidies should limit sprawl (and perhaps fragmentation 
as well). Unfortunately, however, using infrastructure policies 
to curb suburban growth and rein in municipal autonomy may 
have negative distributional consequences including, impor-
tantly, a loss of affordable housing and a related reduction in 
opportunities for intrametropolitan mobility. 
I.  THE SUBURBAN ORIGINS OF  
SUBURBAN AUTONOMY 
Most of Dilworths book consists of microhistories of four 
urban consolidation efforts in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries: New York Citys effort to annex Yonkers in 
the early 1870s,17 the consolidation of greater New York City in 
1898,18 Jersey Citys expansionist ambitions in the late 1860s 
and early 1870s,19 and the Greater Newark movement in the 
early twentieth century.20 The history of the decisions that gave 
this important region its modern political shape is, standing 
alone, a fascinating one, and Dilworth provides a dauntingly 
detailed account of the various factors influencing these deci-
sions. In his introduction and conclusion, however, Dilworth 
asserts that his account, with its particular focus on the provi-
sion of city infrastructure, helps explain the political fragmen-
tation that characterizes modern metropolitan regions.21 In an 
effort to understand whetherand whythis claim is valid, 
this part of the Essay focuses on three ways that Dilworths 
historical account sheds light on the current debates about the 
growth and governance of modern metropolitan America.22 
 
 16. Throughout this Essay, I use the term new infrastructure policies 
because these efforts represent a significant departure from the century-long 
pattern of public subsidization that developed around the time that Dilworths 
study begins. I use the term new for convenience, despite the fact these poli-
cies began to emerge over three decades ago. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSÉ 
A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ WITH ARNOLD M. HOWITT, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 1833 (1993). 
 17. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 5162. 
 18. Id. at 90107. 
 19. Id. at 10851. 
 20. Id. at 15293. 
 21. Id. at 110, 194201. 
 22. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 
9, at 1115 (The governance of metropolitan areas is the central problem for 
local government law today.). 
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First, the parallel attitudes toward big cities a century ago 
and today serve as a helpful reminder that suburban aversion 
to urban governments is nothing new. Second, the evolution of 
local government power over the past centuryfrom the truly 
disabled city governments that Dilworth describes to munici-
palities armed with broad home-rule authoritymakes subur-
ban aversion to joining forces with their urban neighbors all 
the more difficult to overcome. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, by emphasizing the early connection between public in-
frastructure and suburban development, Dilworth helpfully 
highlights the roots of modern ambivalence about suburban 
growth. The suburbs that Dilworth studies already understood 
the importance of local infrastructure policy. By shaping public 
works projects, many of these late nineteenth-century commu-
nities were able to define their own, suburban, identitiesto 
remain independent from territory-hungry urban neighbors, to 
attract the right kind of residents to migrate to their borders, 
etc. This pattern, which has replicated itself many thousands of 
times over the course of the past century, continues to shape 
our metropolitan regions today. 
A. SUBURBAN IDENTITY AND SUBURBAN AUTONOMY 
Dilworths book seeks to illuminate why metropolitan 
fragmentation began to emerge during the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Dilworth painstakingly accumulates evidence suggesting 
a correlation between suburban communities decisions to in-
corporate independently or join another municipality and the 
level of investment in public works.23 Ultimately, however, 
while he makes the case that early investments in public works 
helped shape the political landscape in New York and New Jer-
sey,24 his account falls short of its promise causally to connect 
urban infrastructure and suburban autonomy. Instead, if these 
tales prove anything, it is that suburban communities re-
mained autonomous whenever possible. Suburbanites then, as 
suburbanites now, saw urban governments as corrupt, ineffi-
cient, tax-generating leviathans. They reluctantly joined their 
urban neighbors only when they could see no other alternative. 
Several themes dominated the debates surrounding the 
urban annexation and consolidation efforts that Dilworth stud-
ies. All of them will be familiar to those attuned to modern de-
 
 23. DILWORTH, supra note 1, passim. 
 24. Id. 
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bates about metropolitan governance. First, late nineteenth-
century suburbanites believedwith reasonthat urban gov-
ernments were corrupt and inefficient. Interestingly, the very 
public works projects that cities used to lure their suburban 
neighbors frequently were the font of the corruption. Most fa-
mously, in 1870, a state senator named William Tweed suc-
ceeded in securing the enactment of a new home-rule charter 
for New York City.25 Senator Boss Tweed became the first 
commissioner of the public works department under the new 
charter, where he proved to have a true gift for marshalling 
public-works-related graft into political power.26 Not surpris-
ingly, the desire to remain clean and avoid machine politics 
played a central role in many suburbs decisions to spurn an-
nexation proposalseven if it meant turning away a promise of 
needed services. In response to a proposal by Jersey City to an-
nex neighboring Bayonne, for example, the local paper warned 
that every improvement would degenerate into a job, and only 
those streets would be opened for which the ring received the 
most money.27 
Suburbanites also associated urban governmentsand the 
services that they promisedwith high taxes. The Bayonne 
Herald article quoted above, for example, warned that annexa-
tion by Jersey City would mean higher taxes to fill the pockets 
of patriotic place hunters and political thieves.28 Opposition to 
Jersey Citys expansion plans in Hobokena town that had 
been privately developed as a suburban location where one 
could escape the trials of the big city, such as yellow fever and 
heavy taxes29also centered on the tax burden associated 
 
 25. Id. at 47. 
 26. See id. at 43 (noting that as early as the 1850s, the term laying pipe 
had come to refer to the patronage and corruption generated by construction of 
the Croton Aqueduct); id. at 47 (discussing the rise of Boss Tweed). 
 27. Id. at 138; see also id. at 7374 (noting that Mount Vernons decision 
to remain independent coincided with shocking revelations about the extent 
of corruption in New York City); id. at 74 (quoting a newspaper article observ-
ing that opposition to a Greater New York proposal in Queens County was mo-
tivated by fear of Tammany); id. at 8688 (arguing that Brooklyn narrowly 
approved on consolidation with New York because, at the time, New York 
Citys reform government was viewed as preferable to Brooklyns own ma-
chine politics); id. at 129 (quoting a newspaper editorial suggesting that Ho-
boken consolidation with Jersey City threatened residents with the disease 
ringology or ringold prevailing there) . 
 28. Id. at 138. 
 29. Id. at 121. 
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with the expanded infrastructure.30 In Hoboken and elsewhere, 
residents were willing to accept fewer services rather than risk 
the high taxes and corruption associated with infrastructural 
development.31 Dilworth makes a convincing case that New-
arks cautionary approach to infrastructural development in 
the late nineteenth century, driven by a fear of taxes and mu-
nicipal debt, set the stage for the citys failed efforts to expand 
during the early twentieth century.32 
Finally, and most interestingly, Dilworths case studies il-
lustrate the extent to which suburban decisions to remain 
autonomous were driven by an emerging suburban identity. A 
number of historians have linked the early development of 
American suburbs with the rise of an antiurban ideal during 
the late nineteenth century.33 Kenneth Jackson has observed, 
for example, that as early as the mid-nineteenth century, 
[s]uburbia, pure and unfettered and bathed by sunlight and 
fresh air, offered the exciting prospect that disorder, prostitu-
tion, and mayhem could be kept at a distance, far away in the 
festering metropolis.34 Dilworths book provides ample evi-
dence that early suburbanites desire to separate themselves 
politically, as well as geographically, from urban life (and im-
migrant and minority urban residents) drove opposition to an-
nexation in many communities. Early suburbanites saw their 
communities as a way to escape the perceived chaos of city life. 
Two years before residents of Mount Vernon, New York, re-
jected a proposal to consolidate with New York City, the incom-
ing mayor opined in his inaugural address, 
This city is purely a place of residence, a home. The hum and noise, 
the smoke and steam, with the hurry and bustle of traffic . . . is all 
absent here. The quiet of the villa, the park, the pleasant lawn, the 
modest, substantial and beautiful home characterize Mount Vernon. 
A large majority of our citizens go into the great metropolis daily, and 
there amid the din and strife, fight the battle of life, leaving their 
peaceful homes meantime in our care.35 
 
 30. Id. at 12829. 
 31. See id. at 11011 (Infrastructural development would probably have 
proceeded at a quicker pace in Hoboken had residents approved consolidation. 
Instead . . . residents appear to have voted by a majority against consolidation 
because of concerns about political corruption and taxation.). 
 32. Id. at 15465. 
 33. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning 
Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 120506 
(2001) (reviewing literature). 
 34. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 70. 
 35. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 73. 
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Even in Brooklyn, which we hardly think of as a suburb 
today, the main opposition to the Greater New York proposal 
came from the Protestant social elite, who saw their city of 
homes as a place of moral virtue that would be defiled by a 
closer association with New York City.36 
Dilworth makes a particularly strong case that this ethnic 
and moral superiority undermined the early twentieth-century 
Greater Newark movement. For example, residents of nearby 
Bloomfield were concerned that annexation by Newark would 
introduce Sunday activities associated with Newarks large 
immigrant German population.37 At a public meeting on the 
annexation proposal, one resident repeatedly warned that an-
nexation would mean beer gardens and Sunday baseball ga-
lore.38 The fact that other Newark suburbs, including Mont-
clair and the Oranges, never seriously considered annexation 
was likely also linked to the strong antiurban sentiment in 
these affluent enclaves.39 It is hardly surprising that the same 
residents who warned that streetcar service threatened to in-
troduce the usual and wretched surroundings which always 
follow in its trainthe half-way house, the beer saloon, Sunday 
picnics, loafers, and other riff-raff 40 also rejected Newarks 
annexation proposal out of hand.41 
B. THE RISE OF THE AUTONOMOUS SUBURB 
Richard Briffault has observed that [t]wo themes domi-
nate the jurisprudence of American local government law: the 
descriptive assertion that American localities lack power and 
the normative call for greater local autonomy.42 Both of these 
ideas are strongly associated with Jerry Frug, who has done 
much to advance the view that city powerlessness is to blame 
 
 36. Id. at 105. 
 37. Id. at 178. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 18182. 
 40. Id. at 174. 
 41. William Fischels work provides an alternative explanation for the 
failure of the Greater Newark movement, which did not gain steam until the 
early twentieth century. Fischel asserts that suburb-city consolidations ceased 
after 1910, as suburbs began to use zoning to immunize themselves from in-
frastructure-dependent industry. With their residential character guaranteed, 
suburbs had less need for the infrastructure that came with consolidation. See 
William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclu-
sionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 32526 (2004). 
 42. Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 1. 
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for todays urban ills. In his important article, The City as a Le-
gal Concept, Frug argues that cities are, legally speaking, 
rather pathetic creatures.43 For the reasons that Frug describes 
in detail, a citys legal status can only be fully understood 
against the backdrop of the historical evolution of the modern 
American corporation. Prior to the early nineteenth century, 
American law made no distinction between public and private 
corporations. A corporation was a corporationa legally dis-
tinct entity empowered by a legislative charter to carry out cer-
tain narrowly defined, and frequently public, purposes.44 Dur-
ing the early years of the nineteenth century, American legal 
thinking underwent a remarkable transformationthe concep-
tual separation of the private and public generally, and of 
private and public corporations in particular.45 
It is beyond dispute that municipalities did not fare well 
from this transformation. Business corporations became inde-
pendent rights holders, constitutionally protected from unrea-
sonable state interference. Moreover, the gradual erosion of the 
ultra vires doctrine and the passage of general incorporation 
laws guaranteed the proliferation of private corporations with 
broad authority to engage in a wide range of activities.46 In con-
trast, municipal corporations came to be viewed as subordinate 
toand carrying out the purposes ofthe states.47 By the late 
nineteenth century, private corporations were well on their way 
 
 43. FRUG, CITY MAKING, supra note 15, at 1825; see also Gerald E. Frug, 
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980) [hereinafter Frug, 
City as a Legal Concept]. 
 44. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 17801860, at 11122 (1977); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 
43, at 110102. 
 45. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 44, at 11214 (discussing development 
of the public/private distinction); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, 
at 110004 (discussing separation of public and municipal corporations); Joan 
Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 
64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 23235 (1985) (discussing the role of municipal corpora-
tions in development of public/private distinction). 
 46. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
18701960, at 7778 (1992); Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at 
1101 (describing a Jacksonian effort to pass general incorporation laws, thus 
allowing the privilege of incorporation to be exercised by all). 
 47. Hendrik Hartogs history of the Corporation of New York City illus-
trates both the effect of the transformation on our nations greatest city and 
the remarkably conservative approach that posttransformation municipal 
leaders took toward grants of legislative authority. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC 
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
IN AMERICAN LAW, 17301870, at 179258 (1983). 
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toward autonomy,48 while city governments had become subject 
to state domination.49 Dilworths story begins at precisely this 
time. Indeed, it is an interesting coincidence that his first case 
study examines Yonkerss 1872 decision to incorporate as a 
municipality rather than to be annexed to New York City. That 
same year, Judge John Dillon wrote his famously influential 
Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, which 
advocated the application of a super-strong version of the ul-
tra vires doctrine.50 Dillons Rule provides that municipalities 
have only those powers expressly granted by state law, and, 
moreover, that [a]ny doubt . . . concerning the existence of 
power is resolved . . . against the corporation, and the power is 
denied.51 It continues to govern questions of local authority 
absent a grant of home-rule authority today.52 
Dilworth treats the relationship between state and local 
governments as merely an interesting backdrop to his series of 
interlocal tales. This is unfortunate, for it neglects an impor-
tant opportunity to learn more about how the evolving balance 
between state and local power shaped, and continues to shape, 
the metropolitan landscape. State-local relations affected the 
outcome of annexation and consolidation efforts in two very dif-
ferent ways. First, during the late nineteenth century, the truly 
subservient position of some cities prevented them from devel-
oping needed infrastructure. This may have led to consolidation 
in some cases. For example, according to Dilworth, weak mu-
nicipal charters may have led Long Island City and Brooklyn to 
consolidate with New York City.53 At one point, the New York 
 
 48. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1989) (describ-
ing The Middle Period [of corporate development]the 1850s to the 1880s, 
when [t]he states enacted general corporation laws to assure equal access to 
the corporate form); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 201, 208 (1990) (noting [t]he pervasive adoption of general incorporation 
statutes by many states during the latter half of the 19th century). 
 49. See Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at 1108 (describing 
how local autonomy gave way to state control in the late nineteenth century). 
 50. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 26667 (6th ed. 2001) (describing inception of Dillons 
Rule). 
 51. Id. at 266. 
 52. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooleys City: Traces of Local 
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 50609 (1999) (explaining Dillons 
Rule and its application). 
 53. The 1870 charter incorporating Long Island City, New York limited 
the citys total expenditures to $25,000 per year. While the spending limit rose 
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legislature divested Brooklynat the time, the third largest 
city in the nation54of virtually all power, giving authority 
over essential services such as police and public works to state-
appointed commissions.55 On the other hand, Dilworth asserts 
(not unconvincingly) that Hobokens weak charter, which pre-
vented the development of a municipal waterworks, gave resi-
dents a taste for suburban life that led them to reject Jersey 
Citys overtures.56 Perhaps, however, Jersey City would have 
been better positioned to overcome Hobokens concerns if, in 
1870, New Jersey had not passed a new charter that divested 
[the city council] . . . of every public function, except that possi-
bly of granting licenses to saloon-keepers.57 
Second, while the struggles over local authority between 
large cities and state legislatures are not entirely incongruous 
with modern local government law,58 Dilworth fails to appreci-
ate the importance of the emerging legislative deference to 
suburban political autonomy. For example, throughout his 
study, legislatures granted suburban residents de facto self-
determination when it came to questions of independence. To-
day, annexation and incorporation procedures require no direct 
intervention by state legislatures.59 The act of municipal gov-
ernment formation is initiated privately, by a petition signed by 
some specified percentage of residents or landowners living 
within the proposed municipal boundaries.60 This petition is 
 
to $75,000 per year in 1871, the city government lacked funds to provide des-
perately needed improvementsstreet lights, pavement, sewers and water-
works. Instead, residents were forced to petition the legislature to create spe-
cial commissions that had the authority to issue bonds for specific public 
projects. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 7577. Brooklyns charter also required 
public infrastructure improvements to proceed piecemeal, with the legislature 
creating commissions on a project-by-project basis. Id. at 8485. 
 54. Id. at 80. 
 55. Id. at 84. 
 56. The 1855 charter incorporating Hoboken, New Jersey, restricted mu-
nicipal expenditures on water to one dollar per annum, per capita, for every 
actual resident in the city. Id. at 12425. 
 57. Id. at 141 (quoting 1 WILLIAM E. SACKETT, MODERN BATTLES OF 
TRENTON 8788 (1895)). 
 58. Importantly, local governments remain mere political subdivisions of 
the states. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). They derive 
their powers and rights wholly from the legislature, which may de-
story, . . . abridge[,] and control them. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 221 
(1903). 
 59. See generally OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT LAW 23033 (2d ed. 2001). 
 60. Id. at 23031. 
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filed with some intermediate decisionmaker, usually the county 
government or trial court, which determines that certain 
minimal prerequisites have been satisfied.61 Thereafter, an 
election determines whether the area will be incorporated as a 
municipality.62 In most states, boundary changes, such as the 
annexation of unincorporated territory, proceed according to 
similar standardized, and locally-driven, procedures.63 
The trend toward general municipal incorporation and an-
nexation procedures began in the first half of the nineteenth 
century64 and the New Jersey suburbs that Dilworth studies 
may have taken advantage of the states borough incorpora-
tion law to immunize themselves from annexation.65 This vil-
ligification process has been linked with the emergence of met-
ropolitan fragmentation in the late nineteenth century.66 It is 
clear from Dilworths account that these procedures were un-
available in New York during the time that he studies. As a re-
sult, the state legislature itself issued charters incorporating 
municipal governments and specifying their powers; special 
legislative action was also required for boundary changes, such 
as annexation and consolidation.67 Technically, therefore, sub-
urban residents of nineteenth-century Mount Vernon, New 
York, had no power to decide whether to approve or reject an 
annexation proposal. That decision was solely in the hands of  
 
 
 61. Id. at 23132. 
 62. See id. at 23133; see also Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 74 
(The principal criterion for deciding whether a municipality will be incorpo-
rated is whether the local people want it. There are few limits on local discre-
tion.). 
 63. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 78 (As a general rule, 
the states no longer provide for annexation or consolidation by special legisla-
tive act. . . . Instead, the states have delegated territorial and boundary deci-
sions to the annexing city, the territory to be annexed or the localities to be 
merged.). 
 64. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 208 (discussing more general and 
automatic procedures for incorporation adopted in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury); Jon C. Teaford, The Birth of a Public Corporation, 83 MICH. L. REV. 690, 
699701 (1985) (discussing the trend toward general incorporation). 
 65. See Albert J. Wolfe, A History of Municipal Government in New Jersey 
Since 1798, at 78, http://www.njslom.org/history_municipal_govt.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining that the Borough Act of 1878 allowed small 
townships to establish themselves as independent boroughs through petition 
and referendum). 
 66. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 15053. 
 67. See, e.g., DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 4451. 
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the state legislature; popular votes were purely advisory.68 Yet, 
legislators tended to respect local desires.69 
Kenneth Jackson has chronicled the extent to which state 
legislatures ratified the forcible annexation of suburban com-
munities against the clear wishes of their residents during 
most of the nineteenth century.70 He also demonstrates, how-
ever, that annexations began to fall in the 1870s, precisely 
when Dilworths study began.71 Jackson posits three general 
explanations for this phenomenon: general incorporations laws 
that permitted communities to immunize themselves from an-
nexation, the related abolition of the doctrine of forcible an-
nexation, and substantial improvements in suburban infra-
structural capacity.72 Dilworths history supports all of these 
hypotheses. Clearly, the state legislatures of the time, domi-
nated by rural, Republican, and Protestant interests, shared 
suburban contempt for urban government. It is unlikely that 
the same legislators who sought to restrict urban power in myr-
iad ways would go out of their way to force consolidation upon 
hostile suburban communities. Thus began the pattern of legis-
lative permissiveness toward suburban autonomy that set the 
stage for metropolitan fragmentation.73 
The legislative deference to suburban autonomy that began 
to emerge during the late nineteenth century continues to con-
tribute to intrametropolitan inequities. Most local governments 
operate under a broad delegation of power,74 including (in many 
cases) home-rule authority to advance local interests without 
legislative authorization.75 Moreover, once municipal bounda-
ries are established, state legislatures rarely act to change 
 
 68. See id. at 9095. 
 69. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 210 (noting that, after 1850, consolida-
tions and annexations tended to occur only with both parties consent). 
 70. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 14748. 
 71. See id. at 14951. 
 72. See id. at 15253. 
 73. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL 
FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA 18501970, at 531, 18486 
(1979). 
 74. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 1 (Most local govern-
ments in this country are far from legally powerless. Many enjoy considerable 
autonomy over matters of local concern. State legislatures . . . have frequently 
conferred significant political, economic and regulatory authority on many lo-
calities.). 
 75. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2225, 232528 (2003) (describing the initiative function of home rule, 
which authorizes local governments to act without legislative permission). 
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them. They also are loathe to interfere with the exercise of local 
regulatory authority within them, even when local policies gen-
erate significant interlocal externalities.76 Indeed, a strong case 
canand hasbeen made that central cities difficulties stems 
from too much local autonomy rather than too little.77 One re-
sult of this deference is the local government fragmentation 
that characterizes all major metropolitan areas.78 
C. THE INFRASTRUCTURE PARADOX 
Gerald Frug has suggested that there is little in the his-
torical account to suggest that city services were designed to 
fragment American cities into separate, homogenous compo-
nents.79 Dilworths book suggests otherwise. His account 
chronicles how suburban governments over a century ago un-
derstood that they could shape public investments to attract 
the right kind of residents and exclude others. By the late nine-
teenth century, suburban residentsdespite their antiurban 
leaningsunderstood that they needed city services. During 
the first half of the nineteenth century, a municipal revolu-
tion had begun:80 Nineteenth-century cities . . . changed 
Americans expectations of urban government. Streets were 
paved, swamps drained, wells dug, aqueducts constructed, and 
police forces hired, as city governments responded to and 
shaped unprecedented urban growth.81 Not surprisingly, ur-
ban governments were the first to make these improvements; 
population density made infrastructure improvements a public-
health imperative.82 Less populous communities generally were  
 
 
 76. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at 
114748. 
 77. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 7, at 5 (criticizing deference to 
local action that generate interlocal externalities); see also Barron, supra note 
75, at 226671 (describing literature). Frug himself acknowledges as much in 
his later work proposing to make local boundaries more permeable in order to 
address interlocal inequities created by fragmented local power within our 
metropolitan regions. See Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 294300. 
 78. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at 
1120 (describing metropolitan fragmentation). 
 79. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 39 (1998) [herein-
after Frug, City Services]. 
 80. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMER-
ICA 91110 (1975). 
 81. HARTOG, supra note 47, at 45. 
 82. See TEAFORD, supra note 80, at 10506 (noting that most major cities 
had water works by mid-nineteenth century). 
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able to defer such expenditures for longer, but eventually cir-
cumstances necessitated substantial improvements in suburbia 
as well.83 
It was at this point in history that urban governments 
were poised to use their early investment in infrastructure to 
expand geographically, by promising services to suburbs in ex-
change for annexation. That such exchanges occurred is beyond 
dispute.84 For example, support for the Greater New York 
proposal in the Bronx and Brooklyn likely was driven by a need 
to gain access to New York Citys substantial supply of clean 
water.85 New York was able to use the promise of expanded in-
frastructure to annex a number of smaller Westchester County 
communities as well.86 In contrast, the late-coming Greater 
Newark proposal failed in part because of Newarks city fa-
thers long-standing reluctance to make substantial invest-
ments in public works. As a result, Newark had less to offer re-
luctant suburban neighbors that might overcome their concerns 
about beer gardens and Sunday baseball.87 Newarks only suc-
cessful efforts to expand involved the annexation of a few small 
and relatively undeveloped communities.88 Dilworth also makes 
case after case that early infrastructural development in the 
suburbs correlated with decisions to remain autonomous.89 
What is most interesting about Dilworths book, however, 
is not that some suburban communities reluctantly surren-
dered their independence to gain needed public works while 
others remained independent because they did not need them.90 
Rather, the most fascinating stories are of communities that 
spurned annexation even when it meant turning away needed 
 
 83. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 211 (noting that big cities used water 
systems as bait for suburbs with inadequate, and low quality, water supply). 
 84. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 14446 (discussing nineteenth-century 
motives for incorporation). 
 85. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 5657, 8186. 
 86. Id. at 5859. 
 87. Id. at 17880. 
 88. Id. at 16769. 
 89. Id. at 5962 (Yonkers, N.Y.); id. at 95 (Mount Vernon, N.Y.); id. at 153 
(Irvington and Montclair, N.J.); id. at 171 (Bloomfield, N.J.). 
 90. Id. at 5859 (describing Yonkers as one of the best governed, best 
graded, best lighted villages in the country); see also id. at 7475 (noting that 
Flushing was the only Queens County community to vote against consolida-
tion and that it had the best infrastructure); id. at 9395 (discussing Mount 
Vernons rejection of annexation because of independent infrastructural devel-
opment). 
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infrastructure. Dilworths case studies suggest that many sub-
urban residents had contradictory feelings about infrastruc-
tural development. They realized that public works were 
needed to maintain a comfortable suburban lifestyle, but they 
worried that these improvements might invite development 
that would threaten their peaceful retreats.91 Suburban com-
munities reacted differently to these worries. Some invested in 
premium infrastructure in an effort to attract the right kind 
of residents. As Dilworth observes, in East Orange, New Jer-
seya self-styled progressive residential havenpublic im-
provements were extensive, but [t]he cost of progress was . . . 
the second-highest tax rate in the county, which had the added 
benefit of keeping out undesirable elements.92 Other communi-
ties, however, accepted fewer services rather than risk urbani-
zation. This was the case in Hoboken, where residents contin-
ued to rely on private water suppliers rather than invest in an 
expensive public water works or consolidate with neighboring 
Jersey City.93 
The decisions made by these communities further suggest 
that early suburban governments had also come to understand 
that, sometimes, less is more: rapid development does not al-
ways attract the right kind of residents; on the contrary, it may 
scare them away. As a result, the preservation of suburban 
identity requires careful growth management. Early suburbs, 
Dilworths work suggests, used infrastructure policy to manage 
growth. Undoubtedly, other growth management policies, espe-
cially nascent zoning regulations, began to play a role by the 
time that his book closes in the early 1920s.94 
II.  FRAGMENTATION, INFRASTRUCTURE,  
AND SPRAWL 
The further fragmentation of metropolitan governance in 
the decades following this study has only increased the oppor-
tunitiesand incentivesto engage in such identity man-
agement, through, among other things, infrastructure policy. 
Metropolitan fragmentation both results from and produces 
 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 9697 (discussing this tension in Mount Vernon). 
 92. Id. at 182; see also id. at 136 (discussing uniquely suburban invest-
ments in Bayonne, N.J.). 
 93. See id. at 130 (discussing Hobokens response to water shortage). 
 94. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 41, at 32533 (discussing rise of exclu-
sionary zoning). 
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suburban sprawl. Sprawl causes fragmentation for the reasons 
identified in Dilworths studymany communities developing 
on the urban fringe separately incorporate to form independent 
municipal governments. Fragmentation causes sprawl when in-
termunicipal competition leads local governments to adopt poli-
cies that encourage development on the urban fringe.95 As 
noted above, government subsidies for the kinds of improve-
ments that Dilworth studieswater, roads, and sewers
frequently are included among the policy culprits.96 The ex-
tent to which local investments in public works projects have 
contributed to suburban sprawl is not well understood. (One 
difficulty with indicting local governments for flawed infra-
structure policies is that the federal and state governments of-
ten provide the fundingand establish funding prioritiesfor 
local improvements.)97 What is clear, however, is that local 
government spending of funds from all sources on these im-
provements decreased dramatically in recent decades. 
Until the late nineteenth century, special assessments 
levied against property owners who benefited directly from the 
project funded most public works projects. This method of fi-
nancing left the decision making about the pace and scale of 
improvements in the hands of property owners.98 Generally, 
those affected were required to agree to petition the local gov-
ernment to take action.99 As a result, wealthier neighborhoods 
usually were the first to receive improvements.100 Around the 
time that Dilworths study begins, local governments began to 
pay for public works projects through general tax revenues.101 
A number of different factors might explain this shift, includ-
ing: a demand for better city sanitation in unimproved commu-
 
 95. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 
9, at 113435; William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Prob-
lem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 8788 (1999) (discuss-
ing regional business competition as cause of sprawl). 
 96. See Fischel, supra note 41, at 32526. 
 97. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: 
EXTENT OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON URBAN SPRAWL IS UNCLEAR 4748 
(1999) (examining and questioning the link between urban sprawl and the 
subsidization of federal public water and sewer systems). 
 98. See JACKSON, supra note 11 at 131. 
 99. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining the 
practice, benefits, development, and importance of special assessments for 
public works funding in cities). 
 100. See DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 1213. 
 101. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 11, at 131. 
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nities;102 the ascendancy of progressive urban elites who sought 
to improve the living conditions of the urban masses;103 local 
government officials desiring to build their reputation through 
successful development policies;104 and, importantly, the de-
mands of suburban residents who argued that public subsidies 
would encourage development and strengthen the local tax 
base.105 
In the 1970s, local government spending on infrastructure 
began to decline. A number of interrelated factors explain this 
policy shift. By 1965, federal aid to states and localities
including, importantly, grants-in-aid for physical infrastruc-
turebegan to fall short of need.106 A related backlog of new 
projects led to concern that the existing infrastructure was 
overstretched and undermaintained in many communities.107 
This infrastructure crisis108 coincided with two major political 
developments that caused local officials to reconsider their pre-
vious subsidy policies.109 The first was the advent of successful 
tax revolts.110 Beginning with Californias Proposition 13, 
voters amended a number of state constitutions to limit local 
governments ability to raise taxes, especially property taxes.111 
Deprived of their primary revenue raising source, cash-
strapped local governments struggled to find new sources of 
revenue.112 Second, during the same time period, antigrowth 
activists began successfully to challenge longstanding assump-
tions about the benefits of suburban growth.113 
While members of the antitax and antigrowth coalitions 
were not natural bedfellows, antigrowth policies were and still 
 
 102. DILWORTH, supra note 1, at 16. 
 103. See Frug, City Services, supra note 79, at 3941. 
 104. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 13643 (1981). 
 105. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 131. 
 106. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 2526. 
 107. Id. at 2631 (connecting infrastructure backlog to a decline in federal 
subsidies); see also, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Federal Study Calls Spending on 
Water Systems Perilously Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2002, at A22 (dis-
cussing the Environmental Protection Agencys draft report warning that 
spending to maintain and expand water and sewer system lags behind need by 
tens of billions of dollars). 
 108. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 23. 
 109. Id. at 2025. 
 110. Id. at 23. 
 111. Id. at 2325. 
 112. See id. at 2526. 
 113. Id. at 2025. 
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are attractive to local governments facing both revenue short-
ages and pressure to curb development.114 While a complete de-
scription of the resulting policies is beyond the scope of this Es-
say, this Part briefly describes three ways that infrastructure 
policy has changed in response to these incentives: First, some 
local governments link the pace of suburban growth to infra-
structure capacity through so-called adequacy of public facili-
ties programs that preclude new development absent construc-
tion of public facilities, such as adequate roads, sewers, and 
schools.115 Second, a majority of U.S. cities now use develop-
ment exactions and impact fees, ostensibly to internalize the 
cost of new development by forcing developers to fund a wide 
range of government infrastructure and services. And third¸ 
there is a growing support for transferring authority over in-
frastructure funds to regional entities that will channel public 
subsidies, and direct development, in a more rational and equi-
table manner. 
A. ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, many local communities be-
gan to enforce temporary moratoria in new development pro-
jects. Lawmakers justified these restrictions on a number of 
grounds. Some, such as the thirty-two-month moratorium in 
Lake Tahoe, California that the Supreme Court recently up-
held,116 are said to be necessary to promote the governments 
interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory 
agencies,117 who need to deliberate on the pace and scale of de-
velopment.118 Development moratoria frequently are tied to in-
frastructural capacity, in part because such moratoria have a 
greater chance of surviving legal scrutiny. Timed or phased 
growth programs limit the number of new units that can be 
 
 114. See, e.g., James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism, and Di-
versity: Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor 
and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 45, 4748 (2002) 
(linking infrastructure limits with antigrowth concerns); Laurie Reynolds, 
Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the Get What You Pay For Model of Lo-
cal Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 41516 (2004) (connecting the rise of ex-
actions for infrastructure with antigrowth consensus). 
 115. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 10, at 81213. 
 116. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 33941 (2002). 
 117. Id. at 339. 
 118. Id. at 31112. 
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built within a specific period of time.119 The regulating 
agencyusually a local governmentessentially rations per-
mits, awarding them to developments that satisfy certain pre-
requisites, including the availability and sufficiency of public 
services and infrastructure.120 
Adequate public facilities or concurrency regulations 
also limit development based upon the infrastructural capacity 
by requiring a developer to demonstrate that necessary public 
facilities are available before beginning a project, or, in some 
cases, requiring a developer to pay fees to ensure that these fa-
cilities can be made available concurrently with a develop-
ment.121 Adequacy of public facilities requirements are wide-
spread. Indeed, many local governments tie development 
approvals to infrastructure capacity at least on an ad hoc ba-
sisfor example, by denying requests for rezoning or delaying 
new subdivision approvals because of concerns about infra-
structure shortfalls.122 Local governments impose most formal 
adequacy of public facilities requirements. These programs, 
which vary in detail, mandate that developers ensure that in-
frastructural capacity for a new development comports with 
preestablished level of service standards for the commu-
nity.123 A handful of states also require local governments to in-
tegrate concurrency requirements into local land use policies.124 
B. EXACTIONS AND IMPACT FEES 
Over the past three decades, increasing numbers of local 
governments also have turned to new methods of financing 
public works projects, especially land use exactions and impact 
fees. Land use exactions generally require developers to provide 
 
 119. See, e.g., JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND 
USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 9.2 (1998). 
 120. Id. § 5.2 (explaining that judicial approval of a timed-growth program 
adopted in Ramapo, New York represented an early victory for growth-
management proponents (citing Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359 
(1972))); ERIC DAMIAN KELLY, MANAGING COMMUNITY GROWTH: POLICIES, 
TECHNIQUES, AND IMPACTS 4853 (1993). 
 121. S. Mark White & Elisa L. Paster, Creating Effective Land Use Regula-
tions Through Concurrency, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 753, 754 (2003); see, e.g., 
KELLY, supra note 120, at 4448. 
 122. See White & Paster, supra note 121, at 755. 
 123. Id. at 75862. 
 124. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(6)(h), .3202(2)(g), .3180 (2005); MD. CODE 
ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 5-7B-03(d) (West 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 6086(a)(9)(a) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(6)(b) (2005). 
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property or public facilities as a condition of receiving regula-
tory permission to develop. Exactions can be in-kindthe de-
veloper must make certain improvements, such as installing 
sewers, providing street lighting, or paving roadsor, they can 
be monetary, in which case the developer must pay impact fees 
in lieu of the in-kind improvements.125 Exactions are, in many 
ways, nothing new.126 The Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act,127 adopted in many states in the 1920s, authorizes local 
governments to require developers to construct streets, water 
mains, and sewers in new developments.128 Since that time, 
many local governments have required developers to construct 
and dedicate facilities to the community. Over time, communi-
ties increased their demand for such dedications from basic in-
frastructuresewers, streets, and sidewalksto property for 
public facilities such as schools, fire and police stations, and 
parks.129 Today, subdivision regulations routinely require de-
velopers to provide certain public improvements as a condition 
of receiving regulatory approval.130 
While data regarding the nature and extent of local gov-
ernment exactions are lacking,131 it is clear that current prac-
tices depart dramatically from earlier antecedents. Impor-
tantly, a majority of cities now impose impact fees in addition 
to traditional dedications and improvements.132 As Alan Alt-
shuler and Jose Gómez-Ibáñez have persuasively argued, the 
shift toward impact fees was an epochal one.133 More recently, 
a United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment report characterized the increasingly widespread adop-
tion of impact fees as a dramatic change in the regulatory en-
 
 125. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 3. 
 126. FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 67 (asserting that exactions have been a 
widely used tool in American land-use controls for at least a half a century). 
 127. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act is reprinted in DAVID R. 
MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2005). 
 128. See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: 
J. POLY DEV. & RES. 139, 140 (2005). 
 129. Id. 
 130. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 119, § 7.7. 
 131. See, e.g., Been, supra note 128, at 16364. (calling for more research 
on the effects of impact fees on price and growth). 
 132. Id. at 141 (explaining that 59 percent of cities with more than 25,000 
residents imposed impact fees (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LOCAL 
GROWTH ISSUESFEDERAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2000))). 
 133. ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122. 
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vironment and asserted that communities are asking devel-
opers to bear a larger share of the front-end burden of supply-
ing new infrastructure and added services as a means of paying 
for continued growth.134 Moreover, cities are increasingly ap-
plying impact fees to different types of development to include 
nonresidential land uses135 and even renovations of existing 
properties.136 
Local governments today also use exactions and impact 
fees to fund a much wider range of services and facilities. As 
recently as 1985, the vast majority of impact fees funded water 
lines, sewers, and roads.137 More recent studies suggest that in-
creasing numbers of local governments rely on impact fees for 
other public services, including schools, low-income housing, 
fire and emergency services, traffic mitigation, public transpor-
tation, and open space.138 A growing minority of communities 
rely upon exactions to provide affordable housing as well. Link-
age programs require developers, especially commercial devel-
opers in central cities, to agree to offset the anticipated costs 
of the proposed development.139 San Francisco, for example, re-
quires commercial developers seeking to convert residential 
property to nonresidential uses to pay a substantial fee to offset 
the anticipated loss of moderate-priced housing.140 Inclusionary 
zoning programs impose similar requirements on residential 
developers. Usually, inclusionary zoning rules require develop-
ers to set aside a certain percentage of new residential units for 
low- and moderate-income residents and to sell or lease these 
units to the targeted residents at affordable (i.e., below mar-
ket) prices.141 
Not surprisingly, the fastest growing communities are 
most likely to impose fees,142 and impact fees have generally 
 
 134. U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WHY NOT IN OUR COMMUNITY?: 
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 8 (2004), available at http:// 
www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/wnioc.pdf. 
 135. See Been, supra note 128, at 14042. 
 136. See, e.g., Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Develop-
ment Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1027 (1991). 
 137. Been, supra note 128, at 141. 
 138. See id. at 141 (describing the types of projects which impact fees fund). 
 139. See Schukoske, supra note 136, at 101527 (describing the character-
istics and implementation of linkage fee programs). 
 140. See San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 92 (Cal. 2002). 
 141. See also Been, supra note 128, at 14041; Robert C. Ellickson, The 
Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 117084 (1981). 
 142. See Been, supra note 128, at 142 (noting that communities undergo-
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been championed as a way to internalize the full cost of new 
development.143 As Vicki Been observes, by requiring the de-
veloper and its customers to pay to mitigate the negative effects 
a development may have on a neighborhood . . . impact fees 
again may encourage efficiency by making the developer and 
its customers internalize the full cost of the harms that the de-
velopment causes.144 This view is generally shared across the 
political spectrum. For example, in the conservative Heritage 
Foundations Guide to Smart Growth, Samuel Staley asserts 
that [p]roperty owners and developers should bear the full 
costs of property development.145 The idea that developers and 
their customers should bear the full cost of new development is 
rarely challenged, although both judges146 and economists have 
questioned the ability of government to calibrate those costs ac-
curately.147 Objections to exactions generally focus on policy de-
sign questions about the level and extent of exactions.148 There 
is a significant concern that local governments may dramati-
cally overcharge developersthat is, that impact fees do not 
simply force newcomers to internalize the cost of new develop-
ments. Staley, for example, asserts that fees are often abused 
and become another source of general revenues for local gov-
ernments.149 His concerns are echoed in a recent report by the 
 
ing the most growth . . . appear to be most likely to adopt fees); cf. Andrejs K. 
Saburskis & Mohammad Qadeer, An Empirical Estimation of the Price Effects 
of Development Impact Fees, 29 URB. STUD. 653 (1992) (examining the rela-
tionship between land development and impact fees). 
 143. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 6667. 
 144. Been, supra note 128, at 143. 
 145. Samuel R. Staley, Reforming the Zoning Laws, in A GUIDE TO SMART 
GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 61, 73 (Jane S. Shaw & 
Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000). 
 146. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 114, at 41725 (discussing application 
of proportionality reviewwhich requires a relatively close connection be-
tween the exaction imposed and the impact of the proposed developmentto 
exactions and impact fees). 
 147. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122 (arguing that 
the central premise of this trendthat responsibility for communal needs can 
be allocated objectively to private partiesis largely a myth); see also, e.g., 
Wes Clarke & Jennifer Evans, Development Impact Fees and the Acquisition of 
Infrastructure, 21 J. URB. AFF. 281, 287 (1999) (noting that local officials may 
use impact fees to slow growth, rather than to finance infrastructure). 
 148. See ALTSHULER & GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 16, at 122 ([E]ven if one 
accepts the basic premise underlying exaction usage, that all new development 
should cover the full local cost of service expansion and mitigation attributable 
to it, wide room exists for dispute about the scope and scale of exactions.). 
 149. Staley, supra note 145, at 73; see also FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 67 
(noting that exactions may extract payments in excess of the social costs of 
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Department of Housing and Urban Development, which warns 
that many impact fees are disproportionate to actual develop-
ment costs and unreasonably drive up the cost of housing as a 
result.150 
C. THE NEW-REGIONALIST SOLUTION 
Opponents of metropolitan fragmentation have set forth a 
variety of proposals to guarantee a more equitable distribution 
of resources among the municipalities within a metropolitan 
area.151 These new-regionalist proposals tend to advance the 
same goals as so-called smart-growth policies.152 Both favor 
directing growth within a metropolitan area through a variety 
of planning mechanisms, including selectively channeling in-
frastructure subsidies to areas deemed appropriate for new 
growth, such as suburban infill projects. New regionalists ar-
gue that decisions about land use and infrastructure policy 
should be centralized to prevent fragmented local governments 
from making decisions that exacerbate regional inequities. In 
an example cited by Sheryll Cashin, between 1980 and 1990, 
Chicagos growing, affluent northwest suburbshome to forty 
percent of the regions peopleenjoyed the benefit of sixty per-
cent of the regional highway expenditures.153 In response to 
these disparities, new regionalists would take away local gov-
ernments power to make many fiscal decisions, including the 
decision to invest in new infrastructure. Jerry Frugs regional 
 
development). 
 150. See U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 134, at 8. 
 151. See, e.g., Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 
9, at 116471 (arguing for regional general-purpose governments that would 
assume many governmental functions currently carried out by cities); Cashin, 
supra note 12, at 203447 (same); Ford, supra note 15, at 1909 (arguing that 
local boundaries should be maintained but made more porous by permitting 
cross-jurisdictional voting); Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 295 (proposing 
a regional legislature). 
 152. Smart-growth advocates and new regionalists tend to use different 
justifications for their policies. Smart-growth proponents seek to capitalize on 
popular aversion to suburban growth to advance their agenda, whereas new 
regionalists focus on the need to remedy intrametropolitan inequities. See, e.g., 
Cashin, supra note 12, at 203743 (noting the connection between regionalism 
and smart growth and stating that environmental and quality of life issues 
offer a route to regionalism that may be more politically feasible . . . [and] that 
ultimately address issues of social and economic fairness). 
 153. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Public Subsidies and the Role of Suburbaniza-
tion in Urban Economic Development: A Reply to Timothy Bates, 14 ECON. 
DEV. Q. 242, 245 (2000). 
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legislature would be charged with the allocation of entitle-
ments to local governments.154 Richard Ford would not only 
make local governments more permeable by giving outsiders 
a vote in local elections, but would also deprive cities of the 
right to distribute local revenues. Instead, a state legislature 
or a regional administrative body could distribute [the reve-
nues] according to egalitarian principles of need.155 Similarly, 
both Richard Briffault and Sheryll Cashin have argued in favor 
of regional, general-purpose governments with the authority to 
ensure an equitable distribution of revenues for physical infra-
structure.156 
Local governments in most metropolitan regions, however, 
have proven stubbornly resistant to arguments that they 
should surrender land use and infrastructure-planning author-
ity in the name of interlocal equity. Important exceptions exist, 
but are rare.157 For example, the decade-old political reorgani-
zation of Minnesotas Twin Cities region is frequently ap-
plauded by both regional government and smart-growth propo-
nents. Since 1994, the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities, 
or Met Council, has exercised all sewer, transit, and land use 
planning authority within the region.158 The Met Councils 
most important authority comes from its power to administer 
all sewer and transportation funds for the seven counties and 
188 cities in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. At 
least theoretically, given the connection between infrastructure 
and suburban growth, this authority allows the Met Council to 
establish regional growth priorities and to remedy the excesses 
 
 154. Frug, Decentering, supra note 15, at 296. 
 155. Ford, supra note 15, at 1910. 
 156. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 9, at 
1166 (arguing that the optimal metropolitan area government must have, 
inter alia, the power to collect and distribute [local] revenues in order to pro-
mote greater equalization of local fiscal capacity and local service quality and 
to provide regionwide physical infrastructure); Cashin, supra note 12, at 
204142 (endorsing Briffaults proposal). 
 157. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 12, at 203739 (discussing federally man-
dated infrastructure limits in Atlanta); Cashin, supra note 153, at 246 (dis-
cussing regional transportation authorities in Seattle and Portland). Regional 
special-purpose local government units, such as transportation authorities, 
provide some regionwide coordination in other metropolitan areas. See Gil-
lette, supra note 12, at 20406 (discussing costs and benefits of special pur-
pose authorities). A handful of county-city government mergers also increase 
regional coordination. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 50, at 503 
(noting that city-county consolidations have been extremely rare). 
 158. See ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 13. 
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and inequities of the previous system of fragmented author-
ity.159 Moreover, each municipality in the region is required to 
share a percentage of any annual growth in tax revenues, os-
tensibly to redistribute some of the benefits of the infrastruc-
ture investments received by growing communities.160 
More recently, Maryland adopted a statewide infrastruc-
turebased growth management program called the Smart 
Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative.161 Propo-
nents bill the initiative as an incentive-based approach to 
growth: state funds for infrastructure are channeled into desig-
nated Priority Funding Areas.162 Growth is not prohibited 
outside of these areas, but state infrastructure funding is with-
held unless the local government demonstrates that proposed 
development meets certain state criteria, including a concur-
rency requirement. The Priority Funding Program accompanies 
a Rural Legacy Program, which provides state funds to land-
owners to purchase conservation easements to protect rural 
land from new development.163 
III.  EQUITY AS EXCLUSION? 
The new-regionalist and smart-growth literature fre-
quently contrasts the fortunes of two types of local govern-
mentssprawling fringe suburbs and struggling central cit-
iesand two groups of metropolitan residentsnouveau riche 
McMansion owners and the urban poor.164 Opponents of metro-
politan fragmentation blame the bad fortune of cities and their 
residents on the selfishness of suburban governments and their 
consumer voters. They therefore champion policies that seek 
 
 159. Id. at 135. 
 160. See Cashin, supra note 12, at 2036. 
 161. See, e.g., Parris N. Glendening, Marylands Smart Growth Initiative: 
The Next Steps, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 14971502 (2002) (describing the 
Maryland program); J. Celeste Sakowicz, Urban Sprawl: Floridas and Mary-
lands Approaches, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377, 40818 (2004). 
 162. See Glendening, supra note 161, at 1497. 
 163. See id. at 149798. 
 164. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 95, at 69 (asserting that [e]ach decision 
by residential or commercial real estate developers to build on the urban pe-
riphery rather than invest in central urban areas contributes to the woes of 
the central city and that this pattern create[s] a predictable confluence of 
harms . . . [that] fall most directly on central city residents who often are peo-
ple of color and are most economically vulnerable); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes 
Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 62054 (2002) (providing account of the distributional 
consequences of metropolitan fragmentation). 
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to curb suburban growthincluding the infrastructure limita-
tions outlined aboveas a way to improve the fortunes of cities 
and their poorest residents. These policies are initially appeal-
ing. If metropolitan fragmentation and suburban sprawl con-
tributes to urban decline, then it seems self-evident that curb-
ing growth will improve the fortunes of the urban poor. This 
superficially attractive palliate, however, overlooks an impor-
tant distinction between central cities and their residents: resi-
dents can move; cities cannot. 
There are at least two reasons why this distinction is im-
portant. First, the reality of metropolitan fragmentation means 
that most policies affecting the pace and scale of growth, such 
as impact fees and adequacy-of-public-facilities requirements, 
will be adopted by local governments with an incentive to ex-
clude those of more moderate means. Infrastructure controls 
may simply enhance a local governments fiscal zoning tool-
box. Dilworths book illustrates, after all, that local govern-
ments have used infrastructure policy to manage their growth 
and identity for over a century. Second, even when imposed at 
the regional levelwhich is not likely to be a political reality in 
most placesinfrastructure limitations, like all growth man-
agement techniques, still may limit intrametropolitan mobility 
by reducing the supply of affordable housing. 
A. NEW INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES AND COMMUNITY 
EXCLUSION 
The tendency of local governments to use land use regula-
tions to exclude less desirable residents is well-known. As Wil-
liam Fischel recently demonstrated, the home owners who tend 
to dominate local politics favor policies that maximize property 
values, including zoning policies that favor single family 
homes.165 Because homeowners are richer [and] whiter than 
renters,166 these policies tend to exacerbate existing intra-
metropolitan inequities. This fact is well understood by the new 
regionalists: exclusionary zoning frequently tops their list of 
the evils associated with metropolitan fragmentation. Exclu-
sionary zoning and growth controls also contribute to suburban 
sprawl, both because exclusionary techniques (such as mini-
mum lot size and square footage requirements) necessitate vast 
 
 165. FISCHEL, supra note 10; see also Fennell, supra note 164, at 63435 
(discussing why homevoter dominance leads to exclusionary zoning). 
 166. Fennell, supra note 164, at 628. 
GARNETT_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:52:24 AM 
488 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:459 
 
amounts of land and because communities located on the urban 
fringe are generally more willing to accept land uses rejected by 
affluent inner ring suburbs. Older, wealthier suburbs exclude 
new development, especially of less desirable land uses, effec-
tively pushing it outward to communities with more lenient 
land use policies. Over time, these newer communities seek to 
curb their growth, and the cycle of exclusion and invitation re-
peats itself. The result is the sprawling leapfrog style devel-
opment that characterizes our municipal areas.167 
Infrastructure limitations also can serve as a highly effec-
tive fiscal zoning tool. As the Advisory Commission on Regula-
tory Barriers to Affordable Housing warned more than a decade 
ago, one of the most effective ways of limiting growth is to re-
late development to the availability of public services.168 For 
example, while some opponents of suburban growth criticized 
concurrency policies for encouraging overinvestment in infra-
structure,169 it is generally accepted that they are also used to 
slow or stop new development. The connection between impact 
fees and fiscal zoning is a more complicated one. A major study 
of impact-fee practices conducted in 1989, for example, found 
that communities generally do not consider impact fees to be 
the most effective exclusionary device.170 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, many communities imposing fees also utilize other 
 
 167. See Robert C. Ellickson, Monitoring the Mayor: Will the New Informa-
tion Technologies Make Local Officials More Responsible?, 32 URB. LAW. 391, 
399 (2000) (attributing urban sprawl to exclusionary zoning in established 
suburbs); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 158, 16365 (2001) (reviewing literature). On the connection between 
growth controls and sprawl, see generally, for example, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
DO GROWTH CONTROLS MATTER? (1990) (discussing the connection between 
growth controls and sprawl). On the exclusionary effects and motives of 
growth controls, see generally, for example, Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link 
Between Growth Management and Housing Affordability: The Academic Evi-
dence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 15053 (Anthony 
Downs ed. 2004); Michael H. Schill, Comment on Richard P. Voith & David L. 
Crawford, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra, at 
10203; Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and 
Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban 
Growth Controls]. 
 168. ADVISORY COMMN ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., 
NOT IN MY BACKYARD: REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2-2 
(1991), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/NotInMyBackyard.pdf. 
 169. See, e.g., Sakowicz, supra note 161, at 402; White & Paster, supra note 
121, at 756. 
 170. See Joseph Gyourko, Impact Fees, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Den-
sity of New Development, 30 J. URB. ECON. 242 (1991). 
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growth-management devices.171 Clearly exactions and impact 
fees can, and have, been used to exclude unwanted develop-
ment.172 The 1989 study also found those communities that do 
believe fees are effective exclusionary devices impose higher 
fees than communities that prefer other techniques.173 Another 
study found that impact-fee use was highest in the lowest-
growth and highest-growth communities. (The highest levels 
were found in the fastest growing communities.) The high lev-
els of fees in high-growth communities obviously correlates 
with a need for new infrastructure. Since low-growth communi-
ties generally do not face these same demands, one explanation 
for the u-shaped pattern is that established communities use 
fees to maintain their exclusive status.174 
B. IMPACT FEES AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 
As Michael Schill recently observed, [t]he Achilles heel of 
the smart-growth movement is the impact that many of the 
proposals put forth by its advocates would have on affordable 
housing.175 This is certainly the case with respect to new infra-
structure policies. Consider, for example, impact fees levied on 
a new suburban housing development. Even if the fees are not 
adopted for exclusionary purposes, they will still drive up hous-
ing costs if they are levied in excess of the benefits received by 
the housing consumer.176 When levied in excess of the benefit 
receivedas is frequently the caseimpact fees will increase 
housing costs either directly or indirectly, depending upon 
whether the consumer, developer, or landowner bears the cost 
of the fee.177 While housing consumers do not always pay im-
 
 171. See Been, supra note 128, at 146. 
 172. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 134, at 5 
(arguing that smart-growth techniques, including impact fees, are used to ex-
clude affordable housing); see also Been, supra note 128, at 14647. 
 173. Gyourko, supra note 170, at 244 (noting that there is a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the amount of the fee and the rating of 
its exclusionary strength among cities imposing fees). 
 174. See Been, supra note 128, at 14647. 
 175. Schill, supra note 167, at 102. This collection contains an excellent re-
cent sampling of the voluminous literature on the connection between growth 
management and affordable housing. 
 176. See Been, supra note 128, at 148 (noting that consumers may benefit 
from impact fees if they are more efficient, i.e., cheaper, than taxes, special 
assessments or other funding mechanisms); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Con-
trols, supra note 167, at 43135 (discussing price effects of development 
charges under various economic conditions). 
 177. Whether the consumer, the developer, or the initial landowner bears 
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pact fees, they frequently do. It is obvious that housing devel-
opers will pass the cost of the fees onto housing consumers 
whenever possible, in which case the fees will act to directly in-
crease the price of housing. But, even when the developer or 
landowner bears the cost of the fee, prices will still rise eventu-
ally because the amount of land developed will fall.178 In any of 
these cases, the incidence of impact fees is regressive for the 
same reason that the property tax is regressivewealthier in-
dividuals spend less of their net worth on housing than poorer 
ones.179 Empirical studies of the price effects of impact fees 
demonstrate (unsurprisingly) that impact fees tend to raise the 
price of housing significantly.180 
One obvious response to the concern that new infrastruc-
ture policies increase housing prices is that the true victims of 
fragmentation are the urban poor who have very little hope of 
moving to the suburbs. It is commonly asserted that these indi-
viduals are trapped in desperately poor, segregated inner-city 
communities.181 As I have elsewhere argued, policymakers cer-
tainly should be cognizant of the way that local policies affect 
the lives of our most vulnerable citizens.182 However, there are 
serious reasons to question accounts that suggest the poor have  
 
 
the incidence of impact fees depends on the elasticities of supply and demand 
for undeveloped land and new housing within a community. See Been, supra 
note 128, at 15053. 
 178. See Mark Skidmore & Michael Peddle, Do Development Impact Fees 
Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?, 29 GROWTH & CHANGE 383, 392 
(1998) (finding that introduction of impact fees correlated with a thirty percent 
reduction in the number of new homes built). But see Christopher J. Mayer & 
C. Tsuriel Somerville, Land Use Regulation and New Construction, 30 RE-
GIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 639 (2000) (finding that impact fees did not reduce 
housing starts). 
 179. See Been, supra note 128, at 167. 
 180. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Evans-Cowley et al., The Effect of Development 
Impact Fees on Land Values, 36 GROWTH & CHANGE 100 (2005); Keith R. Ih-
lanfeldt & Timothy M. Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects 
of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets, 34 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 
639 (2004); Shishir Mathur et al., The Effect of Impact Fees on the Price of New 
Single-family Housing, 41 URB. STUD. 1303 (2004). 
 181. See Cashin, supra note 12, at 1987. 
 182. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57 STAN. 
L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Garnett, Ordering] (arguing that current prop-
erty regulations may negatively affect the citizens of urban neighborhoods by 
hindering efforts to cure social disorder); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from 
Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 174 (2001) (arguing that policies prohibiting low-cost forms of private 
transportation limit welfare recipients ability to find and maintain jobs). 
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nothing to lose (or everything to gain) from higher housing 
prices on the urban fringe. 
First, Dilworths history itself provides an important re-
minder that the story of suburban expansion is one of urban 
exodus. (Indeed, this exodus is a central problem with fragmen-
tation, according to the new regionalists.) It is undoubtedly the 
case that many suburbs, including some of the ones that Dil-
worth describes, practiced primitive forms of exclusionary zon-
ing even before zoning laws began to sweep the country in the 
1920s. The connection drawn by East Orange, New Jersey be-
tween expensive infrastructure and exclusive identity, dis-
cussed above, is an early illustration of this phenomenon.183 
But other suburbs billed themselves as workmens paradises 
and sought to use investments in public infrastructure to make 
suburban life accessible to the urban masses. For example, 
Dilworth describes the concern in Bayonne, New Jerseya 
community that rejected annexation in order to remain subur-
banthat improvements were needed to attract the mass of 
humanity trapped in nearby New York.184 Kenneth Jackson 
has also documented early efforts to relocate the urban poor to 
suburban areas where Progressives, somewhat patronizingly, 
believed they would lead healthier, more moral, and more 
American lives.185 
There remain strong reasons to favor policies that enable 
the urban poor to relocate to the suburbs today. Importantly, 
the spatial mismatch between the center-city poor and service 
industry employment in the suburbs means that, in many 
cases, willing workers simply cannot get to available jobs, even 
when they know about them.186 There are reasons to indict 
suburbanization for contributing to this mismatch, including 
the asserted connection between suburbanization and urban 
disinvestment and the fact that public transportation cannot 
efficiently serve low-density suburban development. It remains 
the case, however, that many poor people likely would be better  
 
 
 183. See DILWORTH, supra note 1 at 136, 182. 
 184. Id. at 13536. 
 185. JACKSON, supra note 11, at 11637; see also, e.g., Richard H. Chused, 
Euclids Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2001) (discussing 
Progressive ideology motivating zoning laws). 
 186. E.g., Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 795, 797808 (1991) (reviewing voluminous literature supporting 
this point). 
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off if they could move to the suburbs, where jobs are more plen-
tiful, public schools are better, and neighborhoods are safer. 
While significant economic and regulatory impediments 
continue to prevent many urban residents from moving to the 
suburbs, the situation is not hopeless. On the contrary, the 
1990s witnessed promising and dramatic declines in concentra-
tions of poverty. Evidence from Census 2000 indicates that both 
the absolute number of high-poverty neighborhoodscensus 
tracts with a poverty rate of forty percent or higherand the 
percentage of Americans living in these neighborhoods declined 
by roughly one-fourth in the 1990s.187 The greatest decline in 
concentrated poverty was experienced by poor African Ameri-
cans: the percentage of African Americans living in high-
poverty neighborhoods fell from 30.4 percent to 18.6 percent.188 
American suburbs, interestingly, actually became poorer dur-
ing this time perioda development that might be seen either 
as a hopeful indicator of the intrametropolitan mobility of the 
urban poor or as a harbinger of developing pockets of suburban 
poverty.189 
The need for affordable housing in the suburbs has been 
made more acute because of the massive HOPE VI public-
housing reforms, which fund the demolition of existing urban 
high-rise projects and their replacement with lower-density, 
mixed-income developments.190 Because the existing units will 
not be replaced on a one-for-one basis, the program necessarily 
entails an increasing reliance on Section 8 Housing Mobility 
Vouchers. These HOPE VI projects are generally viewed as a 
success in the popular press.191 Critics, however, assert that the 
 
 187. Paul A. Jargowsky, Stunning Progress, Hidden Problems: The Dra-
matic Decline of Concentrated Poverty in the 1990s, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN 
AND SUBURBAN AMERICA 137, 142 (Alan Berube et al. eds., 2005). 
 188. Id. at 153. 
 189. See Alan Berube & William H. Frey, A Decade of Mixed Blessings: Ur-
ban and Suburban Poverty in Census 2000, in 2 REDEFINING URBAN AND 
SUBURBAN AMERICA 111, supra note 187, at 111. 
 190. See generally Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool 
for Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POLY, 527 (2001) (describing and defending HOPE VI); U.S. DEPT OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., HOPE VI PROGRAM AUTHORITY AND FUNDING HISTORY, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (noting Hope VI was immediate response to the 
Commissions findings). 
 191. For recent commentary, see Jeanette Almada, Construction Begins on 
Roosevelt Square Project, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2004, at 9; Ilene Lelchuk, Back 
Home in North Beach: Residents of Project Glad to Return After Renovation, 
GARNETT_3FMT 12/22/2005 10:52:24 AM 
2005] UNSUBSIDIZING SUBURBIA 493 
 
program succeeds by throwing out the neediest tenants, who 
are deprived of the resources that they need to secure housing 
and forced to resettle in equally dangerous and segregated 
communities.192 Tenant-displacement studies tend to paint a 
more hopeful picture: displaced tenants tended to relocate to 
wealthier, more diverse neighborhoodsalbeit to ones that re-
main relatively poor and segregated.193 Because of the critical 
need for affordable housing in low-poverty areas, policies that 
may drive the up the price of housing in the suburbs may un-
dercut the success of the HOPE VI and Section 8 programs.194 
Finally, leaving aside the question of urban-suburban mo-
bility, suburban developments also play an entirely different 
role in the provision of affordable housing. Many affordable 
housing units come available through what housing economists 
call filtering. Wealthier families in the U.S. tend to occupy 
new housinghence, suburban sprawl. As housing stock ages, 
 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 2, 2004, at B1; Brigid Schulte, New Public Housing Courts 
Middle-Income Tenants; Chatham Square Replaces the Berg, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 11, 2004, at T3; Eric Siegel, For OMalley, a Legacy in Improvement, 
Neighborhoods: The Mayors Strength May Be in Rebuilding, BALT. SUN, Sept. 
16, 2004, at 2B; Leslie Williams, Home Sweet Home: Old St. Thomas Site 
Blooms, City Officials Open River Garden, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), 
Nov. 17, 2004, Metro, at 1. 
 192. See, e.g., Michael S. FitzPatrick, A Disaster in Every Generation: An 
Analysis of Hope VI: HUDs Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. 
ON POVERTY L. & POLY 421 (2000) (summarizing these arguments); NATL 
HOUS. LAW PROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (2002), http://www 
.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/FalseHOPE.pdf; NATL ALLIANCE OF HUD TENANTS & 
NATL PUB. HOUS. TENANTS ORG., REPORT ON THE LOSS OF SUBSIDIZED HOUS-
ING IN THE U.S. (2002), http://www.saveourhomes.org/Senate_Report 
.htm (summarizing data showing loss of subsidized housing attributable to 
HOPE VI). 
 193. See LARRY BURON, URB. INST., AN IMPROVED LIVING ENVIRONMENT? 
NEIGHBORHOOD OUTCOMES FOR HOPE VI RELOCATEES 1 (2004), http://www 
.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311059_Roof_3.pdf (Our findings indicate that relo-
catees generally moved to neighborhoods with lower levels of poverty, slightly 
more racial diversity, and significantly less criminal activity.); LARRY BURON 
ET AL., URB. INST., THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY 7893 (2002), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410591_HOPEVI_ResTrack.pdf (studying 
818 households displaced by eight HOPE VI projects); SUSAN J. POPKIN, URB. 
INST., THE HOPE VI PROGRAMWHAT ABOUT THE RESIDENTS? 1 (2002), 
http://www.urban.org/Uploaded PDF/310593_HopeVI.pdf (The studies paint a 
mixed picture, but on balance the story is generally positive. Many former 
residents now live in better housing in less poor neighborhoods.). 
 194. See SUSAN J. POPKIN & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, URB. INST., SEARCH-
ING FOR RENTAL HOUSING WITH SECTION 8 IN THE CHICAGO REGION (2000), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410314.pdf. 
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wealthier owners move and their original homes tend to filter 
down to less-affluent individuals.195 New housing develop-
ments (even of expensive homes) therefore foster the filtering 
process. If the chain of moves is disruptedfor example, be-
cause the price of new housing increases, leading wealthier in-
dividuals to remodel their existing home rather than move to 
new onesthe pool of affordable housing will be reduced. Sev-
eral studies suggest that impact fees affect the market for af-
fordable housing in this way, that is, to cause existing units to 
filter up to a less affordable market.196 
C. THE REGIONAL PLANNING PANACEA 
None of this is to say that new regionalists do not under-
stand these perils. On the contrary, concerns about the exclu-
sionary effects of local land use policies are frequently cited as 
a primary reason why metropolitan infrastructure and plan-
ning authority should be centralized. New regionalists also un-
derstand the possibility that the kinds of policies they favor 
might negatively impact affordable housing opportunities. But 
again, centralized authority over infrastructure- and land use 
policy is cited as an antidote to the problem. Properly imple-
mented, the argument goes, regional planning can minimize 
the regressive effects of, for example, policies that seek to 
channel and internalize infrastructure costs. New regional-
ists argue that in the best-case scenario, the careful implemen-
tation of other planning toolslinkage and inclusionary zoning, 
density bonuses, impact-fee waivers, and mixed-use zoning
actually may increase the supply of affordable housing.197 
While there is simply not enough evidence to know 
whether affordability-promoting policies can effectively coun-
teract the regressive effects of growth management,198 there 
are a number of reasons to question the perfect planning cor-
rective. First, policymakers may lack the political will to adopt 
effective affordability-promoting policies. For example, Ameri-
cans preference for low-density development and opposition to 
sprawl might lead regional planners to favor growth controls to 
 
 195. Ellickson, supra note 141, at 118485. 
 196. Been, supra note 128, at 16566. 
 197. See, e.g., Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and 
Affordable Housing, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT & AFFORDABLE HOUSING, su-
pra note 167, at 82, 86100. 
 198. See Been, supra note 128, at 168. 
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the exclusion of efforts that promote denser, more diverse, de-
velopment.199 Second, inclusionary zoning programs might 
themselves slow the filtering process and reduce the supply of 
affordable housing. Or, even if the effect on filtering is minimal, 
inclusionary zoning tends to provide a relatively small supply 
of housing for moderate-income, rather than poor, families.200 
Third, regional planning that fails to address the regressiv-
ity problem actually may exacerbate the housing affordability 
crisis to an even greater extent than locally imposed growth 
limits. As Vicki Been has argued, competition between munici-
palities for development may provide an important political 
check on the price of exactions and impact fees.201 But, the en-
tire point of regional planning is to prevent this kind of compe-
tition by preventing local governments from either overpricing 
or underpricing new development within their jurisdiction. The 
housing-affordability concerns raised by regional planning pro-
posals were highlighted during the 2002 election cycle, when 
statewide growth control initiatives were defeated by voters in 
Colorado and Arizona.202 These proposals, which essentially 
would have mandated Portland-esque growth-boundary mod-
els, were wildly popular until housing developers and low-
income housing advocates combined forces to oppose them. In 
Colorado, Habitat for Humanity took a public stand on an ini-
tiative for the first time in their historyexpressing concerns 
that statewide planning would shrink the pool of affordable 
housing.  
Fourth, infrastructure policies that seek to force new own-
ers to internalize the cost of their mobility raise transitional 
fairness concerns. Public opinion polls consistently find that 
substantial majorities of both renters and owners believe that 
people are better-off owning their homes.203 A majority of 
Americans also consider a single-family home in the suburbs to 
be the most attractive housing option and are willing to make 
 
 199. See Garnett, supra note 167, at 16164; Schill, supra note 167; see also 
Sakowicz, supra note 161, at 416 (raising this concern about Maryland pro-
gram). 
 200. Ellickson, supra note 141, at 119496. 
 201. See Vicki Been, Exit as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Re-
thinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 
50928 (1991). 
 202. See Garnett, supra note 167, at 16576. 
 203. See Fennell, supra note 164, at 627; FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DE-
MAND FOR HOUSING: 2002 NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY, available at http:// 
www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf. 
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significant financial sacrificesand commute long distances
to live in one.204 A number of commentators have questioned 
the fairness of asking newcomers to suburbia to pay directly, 
through impact fees, for infrastructure which was previously 
funded by tax revenues.205 Regionally imposed impact fees may 
exacerbate these equity concerns for two reasons. First, if re-
gionally imposed fees are excessive, and the overcharge is used 
as a supplementary revenue source, then existing homeowners 
in established suburbs will have succeeded in extracting rents 
from new homeowners in fringe suburbs. Second, even perfectly 
calibrated fees may signal to suburban newcomers that they 
are being required to pay twicefirst to fund their own im-
provements directly and again through tax revenues for ser-
vices provided to older homes.206 (Locally imposed exactions 
may reduce this possibility to the extent that metropolitan 
fragmentation frequently guarantees that many neighbors are 
similarly situated.) These transitional fairness problems have 
both a generational and a racial component.207 In 2004, Ameri-
cans over the age of fifty-five were nearly twice as likely to own 
their homes as those under thirty-five (81 percent versus 43 
percent).208 Moreover, homeownership rates are highest for 
whites (75 percent), but minority homeownership rates con-
tinue to rise, with nearly half of all African Americans and 
Hispanics owning homes.209 It would be unfortunate if new in-
frastructure policies had the effect of slowing these impressive 
gains. 
 
 204. Garnett, supra note 167, at 17778. 
 205. See supra Part II. The actual fairness of this situation depends on a 
number of factors, including, as discussed above, whether the property owner 
receives amenities equal to or exceeding the impact fee, the extent to which 
the fees reduce later tax burdens, etc. 
 206. On impact fees and transitional fairness, see Been, supra note 128, at 
147; Reynolds, supra note 114, at 43034. On the transitional fairness prob-
lem generally, see Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1657 (1999). 
 207. See Been, supra note 128, at 166 (If impact fees have a greater im-
pact on first-time homebuyers, for example, that may have different impacts 
on racial minorities . . . because so many more Caucasians than minorities al-
ready own their own homes.). 
 208. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership 
Ann. Stat.: 2004, Table 15, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/ 
annual04/ann04t15.html. 
 209. See U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership 
Ann. Stat.: 2004, Table 20, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/ 
annual04/ann04t20.html. 
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Finally, it is critical to consider how new-regionalist 
channeling priorities might affect the promising trend toward 
suburban racial diversity. Evidence from the 2000 Census 
shows that minorities comprise 27 percent of suburban popula-
tions (up from 19 percent a decade earlier).210 The most diverse 
suburbs are found in western metropolitan areas which are 
characterized by the low-density, sprawling development that 
draws the ire of smart-growth proponents.211 Moreover, the 
available data also suggests that it is important to increase the 
supply of starter homes in the suburbs because these new 
neighborhoods tend to be more racially diverse than older 
neighborhoods.212 New-regionalist policies may well reduce 
these housing opportunities because starter-home develop-
ments are frequently located in the fast-growing communities 
on the urban fringe that fall low on the infrastructure priority 
list. 
CONCLUSION 
By returning us to the time when the American metropoli-
tan landscape was just unfolding, Richardson Dilworth pro-
vides a welcome opportunity to consider the relative merit of 
subsidizing suburban growth and suburban political autonomy 
through infrastructure policy. Over the past three decades, op-
ponents of suburban growth have successfully fought to reverse 
decades of infrastructure policy in order to curb sprawl. More 
recently, the new regionalists have made a sophisticated case 
for using these new infrastructure strategies to address the ills 
associated with metropolitan fragmentation. This Essay has 
sought to examine the implications of infrastructure-based 
growth-management strategies for late-comers to American 
prosperity. 
Admittedly, I have no grand plan to solve all of the prob-
lems associated with metropolitan fragmentation. But, as I 
have previously argued, it is critical for cities to evaluate how 
their own land use policies affect the health and vitality of ur-
 
 210. William H. Frey, Melting Pot Suburbs: A Study of Suburban Diversity, 
in 1 REDEFINING URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA: EVIDENCE FROM CENSUS 
2000, at 155, 155 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003). 
 211. Racial diversity rose most sharply in so-called Melting Pot metros 
with large and growing Hispanic and Asian-American populations. Id. at 155
62. Southern cities have also experienced significant gains in minority subur-
banization, largely attributable to Black migration to the suburbs. 
 212. Been, supra note 128, at 164. 
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ban communities.213 There is a risk that the metropolitan frag-
mentation will give cities an excuse to avoid inward-looking re-
forms that may hold the most promise for urban regeneration 
as well as city-suburb cooperation. Dilworths study emphasizes 
the danger of relying too heavily on the regional blame game. 
Suburbanites then, as now, resisted joining forces with their 
urban neighbors in part because of their justified concerns 
about the health and efficiency of urban governance. In his in-
troduction and conclusion, Dilworth suggests that things might 
have been different. If only the Greater Newark movement had 
succeeded, for example, then our cities might not be struggling 
islands of dysfunction surrounded by a sea of selfish and 
wealthy municipal neighbors. The central difficulty with this 
argument is the fact that Dilworths case studies tend to un-
dermine it. While Dilworth presents evidence connecting infra-
structure development and metropolitan fragmentation, he also 
makes fragmentation seem almost inevitable: as soon as the 
suburbanites that he studies could remain autonomous, they 
did. 
When I read Dilworths book, I experienced déjà vu. I live 
in an urban neighborhood in South Bend, Indiana, less than 
one mile from what remains of a once vibrant downtown. Over 
the past four decades, South Bend lost a sizable percentage of 
its population, while at the same time it grew geographically 
through annexation.214 This is a common story for many Rust 
Belt cities, thanks in large part to the precipitous decline of 
the Midwestern industrial base and the out-migration of resi-
dents and businesses to surrounding suburban communities. 
But South Bend hardly has clean hands. For example, although 
sizable territorial gains have done nothing to stem the eco-
nomic and population spiral, the citys main economic develop-
 
 213. See Garnett, Ordering, supra note 182; accord, JERRY J. SALAMAN ET 
AL.¸THE N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URB. POLY, 1999 
REPORT: REDUCING THE COST OF NEW HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK 
CITY (1999), http://www.law.nyu.edu/realestatecenter/CREUP_Papers/cost_ 
study_1999/Summary.pdf (analyzing the regulatory impediments to new hous-
ing construction in New York City and concluding that regulatory reform 
could reduce rents charged by nearly 30 percent). 
 214. Between 1960 and 2000, the city population declined from 132,445 to 
107,789. During this same time period, the city increased in size from twenty-
four to thirty-nine square miles. Dept of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., City of S. Bend, 
City Plan, http://www.southbendcityplan.org/Plan.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2005). 
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ment strategy in past years has been annexation.215 Interest-
ingly, many of the areas wealthy residential subdivisions are 
located in unincorporated territory, where residents enjoy few 
city services. Despite the fact that the city would be obligated to 
provide services to these developments upon annexation
importantly, to replace well-and-septic with sewer-and-water 
systemsresidents oppose annexation with such vehemence 
that they succeeded in securing a state legislative act prohibit-
ing South Bend from annexing them.216 South Bend is cur-
rently in the process of adopting a city plan. During this proc-
ess, the city would do well to consider ways to make South 
Bend a better place to livefor example, amending the zoning 
code to permit more mixed-use development. These relatively 
small regulatory changes would not transform South Bend 
overnight, but they would begin to address why so many who 
can leave, do. 
 
 215. See Dept of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., City of S. Bend, Annexation Policy 
and Plan, http://www.ci.south-bend.in.us/redevelopment/Community% 
20Branch/Annexation.htm#AnnexC (last visited Nov. 10, 2005). 
 216. This law was recently invalidated as illegal special legislation bur-
dening one municipality. City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 693
696 (Ind. 2003); cf. Frug, City as a Legal Concept, supra note 43, at 1116 (not-
ing that special- or local-legislation bans were designed to curb state efforts to 
control detailed city decisionmaking by specific legislation). Communities like 
unincorporated Granger, Indianawhere many of my friends and colleagues 
liveare motivated by economics as much as or more than antiurban bias. Cf. 
Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1849 
(2003) (describing low-density, low-cost geographies where wealthier resi-
dents move to lessen need for city services). 
